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NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES*
FLEMING JAMES**
In this article we shall consider who are "necessary" and "indispens-
able" parties. These terms are words of art. Necessary parties are those
who must be included in an action either as plaintiffs or defendants unless
there is a valid excuse for their non-joinder.' Probably it would be better
to call such parties "conditionally necessary," but the shorter term will
be used here to conform to general modern usage. Indispensable parties
are those who must be included in an action before it may properly go
forward. No excuse will be accepted for their non-joinder.2
There is a further artificial qualification on the use of these terms. If
A alone owes plaintiff a debt, the plaintiff's action cannot go forward un-
less and until A is made a defendant in the action and the court obtains
jurisdiction over his person or his property. In a very real sense A is an
indispensable party. But that is not the sense in which the term is gener-
ally used here; rather it is used in situations where there are at least two
possible defendants (or plaintiffs), to describe a rule which forbids the
suit to go forward even where one is present, in the absence of the other.
The term "necessary" has a similar meaning in this regard, although the
requirement is a conditional one which may be satisfied by a valid excuse
for non-joinder.
The definitions used here are of course arbitrary, and there has been
considerable variation in the way the terms have been used in the past.
In former state practice "necessary" was often used to denote what we
have called indispensable.' But the usage in vogue since about the time
of the federal rules is the one described above and it will be observed
throughout this article.
CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN DETERMINING WHO IS A NECESSARY
OR INDISPENSABLE PARTY
The concepts of necessary and indispensable parties are alike in this
respect: both terms denote parties who should be joined in the action. It
may be useful to think of necessary parties as the larger, all-inclusive
class, out of which the exceptional class of indispensable parties is carved.
* This article will appear as part of a textbook on civil procedure to be published by
Little, Brown and Company.
** Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) ; CLARK, CODE PLEADINO 360-62 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter
cited as CLARK]; 3 MoORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 19.02 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as
MooRE].
2. See sources cited note 1 supra.
3. CLARK at 353-54. For an interesting summary of the various usages of the terms "indis-
pensable," "necessary," and "proper," see Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil
Actions, 55 MICH. L. REv. 327, 328 (1957). See also Comment, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 731 (1941).
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The degree of obligation represented by the word "should" varies and,
as we have seen, the sanctions to implement the obligations are of varying
strength and carry consequences of different gravity. But the reasons
why necessary and indispensable parties should be joined boil down to
a very few basic considerations, one or more of which recur-but again
with varying strength-in all the cases where the concepts are applied.4
The next step then is to examine these considerations.
(1) Protection of the absent party's interests.-A court has no juris-
diction over a person who has not been made a party to an action before
it. No judgment or decree in an action is binding on non-parties, nor is any
finding made in the course of arriving at the judgment.' There are ex-
ceptions to this rule for those who stand in privity with parties,6 and the
doctrine of representation may extend the notions of who are parties,7
but we are concerned here primarily with situations which fall within the
general rule. Under it the judgment cannot validly bind non-parties
through operation of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
It does not follow, however, nor is it true that judgments are always
without practical, substantial effect on non-parties. Some of the most
obvious and often serious of these effects are not in the usual case regarded
as a basis for making the person affected a party at all. Thus a man's
family and his creditors may be greatly affected by a judgment in his
favor or by one against him; but this does not ordinarily give them any
standing as parties to the action, to say nothing of making their presence
necessary or indispensable.
Other practical effects on non-parties are, however, considered in
connection with such an inquiry. Thus, a judgment under which a fund
will be distributed seriously affects all claimants to the fund.' While the
claim of a non-party is not legally extinguished by the judgment, it may
as a practical matter be worthless (for instance when the obligor is insol-
vent) unless it can be satisfied out of the fund. A judgment decreeing
4. The text borrows heavily from the analysis made in Reed, Compulsory Joinder
of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 483 (1957).
This has had influence on recent rules and legislation. See MICH. GEN. COURT RUL.s
205 (1963); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1001. See also NEW YORK ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE, FIRST PRELIMINARY REPORT 248-51 (1957), set out in ROSENBERG AND
WEINSTEIN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS 1126-29 (1962).
Professor Reed's article is complemented by the historical study in Hazard, Indispensable
Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961).
See also WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70 (1963).
5. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); 1 FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF
JUDGMENTS §§ 111, 407 (5th ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as FREEMAN); 30A Am. JUR.
Judgments §§ 73, 393 (1958).
6. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 83-92 (1942); 1 FREEMAN §§ 438-43; 30A AM. Jua.
Judgments §§ 396, 399-403 (1958).
7. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 85-87 (1942) (and cf. § 80); 1 FREEMAN §§ 435-37;
30A Am. Jur. Judgments §§ 404, 405 (1958).
8. Williams v. Bankhead, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 563 (1873); Russell v. Clarke's Ex'rs,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 69 (1812) ; 3 MOORE 2159, 19.08.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
that the plaintiff is the owner of land will not bind non-parties who claim
title or some interest in it, but it will undoubtedly cast a cloud on their
title or other interest. A judgment cancelling a lease to oil land will
inevitably affect persons to whom the lessor has granted a part of the
mineral rights, subject to this and future leases but covering royalties
payable under them. ° Where the State of Texas sought an injunction
against enforcement of allegedly invalid orders of the Railway Labor
Board affecting wages and working conditions of railroad employees, the
railroads and the workers would unquestionably be affected by a decree in
Texas' favor."
In all the situations described in the last paragraph, the non-parties
were held indispensable. But the possibility of an adverse effect on non-
parties, even when it is entitled to consideration, does not always render
them indispensable. Thus in Husting Co. v. Coca Cola Co.,
1 2 plaintiff
alleged that it had had a contract with Western Coca Cola Co. for the
exclusive right to bottle and sell Coca Cola in the Milwaukee area, and
that Wisconsin Coca Cola Co. and Milwaukee Coca Cola Co. had aided
Western to breach this contract and to make a new exclusive contract
with them. Wisconsin and Milwaukee were made defendants and served
with process. Western was named defendant but could not be served. The
plaintiff asked for damages and an injunction restraining the local com-
panies from performing their contract with Western. They answered in
abatement on the ground that Western was an indispensable party, 8 but
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled otherwise. It is clear that the in-
junction would interfere with and probably stop performance by the
local companies under their contract with Western, without Western's
having its day in court to show that this contract involved no invasion of
plaintiff's rights. At best this would leave Western with a lawsuit rather
than performance. Under one line of cases Western would not even have
that, since the local companies' non-performance would be excused by
the decree forbidding it.'4
(2) Protection of present parties from prejudice because of the ab-
sence of non-parties.-The absence of B as a party to an action may work
9. McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1960); Washington v. United States, 87
F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936).
10. Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 782; cf. Brodsky v. Perth Amboy Nat'l Bank, 259 F.2d 705 (3d Cir. 1958).
11. Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158 (1922). Where plaintiff sought
to enjoin a drainage district from using its facilities for disposal of waste water from oil
wells, the proprietors of the oil wells were held to be indispensable parties in Thompson v.
Talbert Drainage Dist., 168 Cal. App. 2d 687, 336 P.2d 174 (1959).
12. 194 Wis. 311, 216 N.W. 833 (1927). For the subsequent history of this case, see
205 Wis. 356, 237 N.W. 85 (1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 538 (1932).
13. The local defendants also alleged that Western had properly terminated its contract
with plaintiff because of plaintiff's failure to live up to its terms.
14. See analysis in Note, Injunction against Performance of Contract in Absence of
Party Thereto, 41 YALE L.J. 1241 (1932).
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prejudice to A, who is a party, in at least two ways. In the first place it
may expose him to multiplicity of suits which, even without complicating
factors, is itself something of an evil. But beyond that is the exposure,
in some situations, to possible injustice such as double liability through
the inconsistent results in two or more lawsuits which may occur because
the non-party is not bound by the first judgment.
An example of uncomplicated multiplicity is found in the case of
partial assignment or subrogation, when a debtor has incurred a single
obligation he ought not to be subjected to multiple suits for its breach.
The law recognizes this and where partial assignees are regarded as real
parties in interest then all the holders of fractions of the claim should be
joined in a single action-all are necessary parties.1" Another example is
afforded where the obligation is originally undertaken to two or more
obligees jointly. 6 If there are two or more suits in these cases, the debtor
will be harrassed-bis vexatus-but he runs no risk of double liability
from inconsistent judgments" (indeed such inconsistency may relieve him
from part of the liability which would be imposed upon him by a single
successful suit).
In other situations, however, a party to an action may be exposed to
multiple liability as well as multiple suits, unless another is also made
a party to the first action so as to be bound by the judgment. Thus, in
Mahr v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 8 the defendant had issued a fire
insurance policy to one Bartlett on his stock of goods in Iowa. Bartlett
then mailed the policy to the plaintiff in New York as collateral for a loan,
without formally assigning it. The goods were later destroyed by fire
and after the loss, Bartlett formally assigned the policy to Kelly of
Iowa. The plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from paying money
under the policy to Bartlett or Kelly and to direct it to pay to the plain-
tiff any money due for the loss. Kelly was not served with process though
15. Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514 (1869); Schilling v. Mullen, 55 Minn. 122, 56 N.W.
586 (1893); Verdier v. Marshallville Equity Co., 70 Ohio App. 434, 46 N.E.2d 636 (1940);
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 44 Utah 26, 137 Pac. 653 (1913); CLARx
at 168-71.
While partial assignees and the partial assignor are all conditionally necessary parties,
they are not indispensable. Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1961);
Rogers v. Penobscot Mining Co., 154 Fed. 606 (8th Cir. 1907); Hirsch v. Glidden Co.,
79 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
16. See text at notes 88-97, infra.
17. If, that is, the only controversy is over defendant's liability and there are no
conflicting claims about the validity of the alleged assignments or the extent of the interests
held by the various potential claimants. Such conflicts may expose defendant to the possi-
bility of multiple liability of the kind dealt with in the Mahr case, text at note 18 infra.
Some courts have held the avoidance of inconsistency to be important enough in itself
to require the presence of all claimants even when that would oust the court of jurisdiction.
American Ins. Co. v. Bradley Mining Co., 57 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Cal. 1944) (where, how-
ever, there was a more convenient forum available in which all could be joined) ; cf. Langlie
v. United Firemen's Ins. Co., 40 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Wash. 1941). Contra, Firemen's Fund
Ins. Co. v. Crandall House Co., 47 F. Supp. 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1942).
18. 127 N.Y. 452, 28 N.E. 391 (1891).
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the court had ordered him to be made a party. The trial court granted
the relief asked for, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Kelly
was an indispensable party since his absence exposed the insurer to the
possibility of double liability. Indeed, as the court pointed out, Kelly had
recovered a judgment in Iowa between the time of the New York trial
court's judgment and the decision of the appeal. 9 The Iowa court noted
that the New York court lacked jurisdiction over Kelly so that its judg-
ment was not binding upon him.
This insistence that a decree should not expose a party to double
liability was a child of equity.2" The law did develop a few devices for
affording this kind of protection in particular situations,2' but no general
principle was erected and the lack of it has been reflected in cases under
the codes. In Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank,2 2 the
directors of a bank chartered by the Imperial Russian Government sued
the defendant to recover a deposit, after the revolution of 1917 and the
confiscation of private property by the U.S.S.R., but before recognition
of the Soviet Government by the United States. The defendant objected
to the action on the ground that recovery would subject it to the possi-
bility of double recovery, since France and other European countries
where the defendant had assets had recognized the Soviet Government.
The New York Court of Appeals, through Cardozo, Ch. J., rejected this
defense. Cases like Mahr were distinguished because they involved
equitable relief and did not govern actions at law.2" "In actions of that
order, a refusal to pay when due is not sustained without more by the
presence of an adverse claim. The defendant, if unable to interplead,
must respond to the challenge, and defend as best it can . . . . 'The
chance of double payment is a common risk of life.' ,,24 In a provocative
note in their casebook, Professors Louisell and Hazard raise the question
whether the recent case of Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania5 may
have cast constitutional doubt on such rulings, at least where the threat
of double liability is very real because both claims are being aggressively
pursued.2
A variant of double liability is the possibility that A, who is entitled
to indemnity from B, may be sued alone and then fail to establish the
19. Kelly v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 82 Iowa 137, 47 N.W. 986 (1891).
20. Contrast the Mahr case, note 18 supra, and Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard,
240 N.Y. 149, 147 N.E. 703 (1925) with Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City
Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930) ; and see text at note 23 infra.
21. The introduction of interpleader to law was largely statutory. See Chafee, Modern-
izing Interpleader, 30 YALE L.J. 814, 818 (1921); MACLENNAN, INTERPLEADER 6-9, App.
(1901) (the Appendix sets out the American statutes then in force).
22. 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930).
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 253 N.Y. 23, 39, 40, 170 N.E. 479, 485. To the same effect is Steingut v. National
City Bank, 38 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
25. 368 U.S. 71 (1961).
26. LOUISELL & HAZARD, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 700 (1962).
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conditions of indemnity against B in a second suit because B is not bound
by the first judgment. The common law developed a measure of protection
to A in some situations of this kind through the device of vouching B into
the first action.
(3) Protection of society's interest in economy and effectiveness in
litigation.-We have already spoken of multiplicity of suits as a burden
on defendant, but society also has a distinct interest in avoiding un-
necessary litigation because of the expense which litigation puts on the
taxpayers and the disadvantages caused to the administration of justice
generally by crowded dockets. Thus, even when a non-party's absence
does not threaten a defendant with multiple suits (as where the later suit
would be by the plaintiff against the non-party), society itself has some
interest in avoiding the second suit.
Closely akin to society's interest in avoidance of unnecessary litiga-
tion is its interest in having a judgment or decree be as complete as
possible. There was a traditional equitable principle
that when a decision is made, it shall provide for all the rights,
which different persons have in the matters decided. For a
"Court of Equity, in all cases, delights to do complete justice,
and not by halves," to put an end to litigation, and to give de-
crees of such a nature, that the performance of them may be
perfectly safe to all who obey them.28
As the quotation shows, the objective of completeness in judgments over-
laps other objectives we have been discussing; a complete decree will
protect parties who obey it as well as forestall further litigation by bind-
ing all persons who have or claim an interest in the controversy.
There are other aspects to this matter of completeness. There are
many degrees of incompleteness. The absence of one party may simply
prevent the court from putting the last piece of frosting on the cake;29
the absence of another may render any judgment an altogether futile
gesture.80 Incompleteness of the former kind may be consistent with a
useful judgment which does substantial justice among the parties present
and no harm to absentees; its most serious vice may be nothing worse
than an offense to an aesthetic yearning for symmetry. Incompleteness
of the latter kind is an entirely different matter. Not only may it invite
further litigation and leave present parties unprotected, but it will always
27. RESTATEMENT, JUDGEMENTS § 107(b) (1942) (and comment e); 1 FREEMAN §§
447-50.
28. CALVERT, PARTIES TO SUITS IN EQurrI 2, 3 (2d ed. 1847).
29. Such as the formal action by corporate directors in declaring a dividend (on pre-
ferred stock) which the corporation is legally bound to pay. See Kroese v. General Steel
Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760, 763-65 (3d Cir. 1950), 50 CoLu. L. REV. 997 (1950), 49
MICH. L. REV. 275 (1950).30. See, e.g., Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Smith, 165 U.S. 28 (1897); cases cited notes
31 and 33 infra.
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have another serious vice. Courts have ever shunned the making of judg-
ments which cannot practically be enforced,3' and rightly so, since the
entering of such idle decrees would soon impair the moral acceptability
of court decisions. If the person who must take action in order to afford
the relief sought is not brought within the court's jurisdiction, there can
be no effective judgment.82 Such a person is indispensable. "[T]he prob-
lem must be tested in terms of the result if, under the particular setting,
the [absentee]-not a party and hence under no coercive court order-
sits tight and does absolutely nothing." ' If his "sitting tight" will thwart
an effective decree, the test is not met.
In this connection it should be noted that developments in the
method of enforcing equitable decrees have narrowed the circle of those
who could defeat a decree by sitting tight and doing nothing. As long as
equity clung to the notion that it acted in personam only, against the
conscience of the defendant, then such remedies as specifice performance
of a contract to sell land, or reformation or cancellation of an instrument,
required personal obedience of the vendor or the original obligor of the
instrument and no decree could be effective unless he was a party to the
suit.34 Now the decree for specific performance may (by statute) itself
vest title to the land in the vendee, or authorize a deed in the vendor's
name to be drawn by some court officer." And upon proper findings, a
court may simply treat an instrument as reformed or cancelled and render
judgment accordingly. Where equitable relief has come to be in rem
in this way, then the other party to the contract or instrument is no
longer needed in order to assure effectiveness to the decree. This is
not to say that such persons may not properly be regarded as necessary
or indispensable for some other reason, but simply that this reason for in-
dispensability is no longer a valid one, though it may sometimes linger
on as a contributing reason in fact, simply because of the frequent
inability to use historical precedent with discrimination. 7
31. Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 423 (1878); see Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F.2d 334,
338 (3d Cir. 1958).
32. Cases cited notes 30 and 31 supra.
33. Johnson v. Kirkland, 290 F.2d 440, 447 (5th Cir. 1961).
34. Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884); Spurr v. Scoville, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.)
578 (1849); HUSTON, ENFORCEMENT OF DECREES IN EQUITY chs. 4, 5 (1915) [hereinafter
cited as HUSTON].
35. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
The statutes in effect in 1915 are collected in the Appendix to HUSTON, at 157.
The West Virginia court gave equitable decrees an in rem effect in land cases without
benefit of statute. Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S.E. 387 (1910) (cloud
on title cancelled against nonresident). See HUSTON chs. 4-6.
36. Mike Occhiato Mercantile Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co., 98 F. Supp. 888 (D.
Colo. 1951); Stubbs v. Standard Life Ass'n, 125 Colo. 278, 242 P.2d 819 (1952); Hornick
v. Union Pac. R.R., 85 Kan. 568, 118 Pac. 60 (1911); Phillips v. Johnson, 202 Okla. 645,
217 P.2d 520 (1950) ; Taylor v. Highland Park Corp., 210 S.C. 254, 42 S.E.2d 335 (1947);
Craft v. Hahn, 246 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
37. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Brewer, 144 Neb. 211, 16 N.W.2d 533 (1944); and con-
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(4) Protection of plaintiff's interest in access to a convenient forum
which will adjudicate his claim on the merits.-The plaintiff clearly has
the greatest interest in securing some forum, preferably a convenient
forum, for the adjudication of his claim on the merits. A ruling that a
non-party is indispensable so that the action may not go forward until
he is brought in frequently will not jeopardize this interest at all. If the
non-party may be brought within the forum court's jurisdiction, and if
his presence will not oust the court of jurisdiction or render venue of
the action improper, then such a ruling will impose no greater burden on
the plaintiff than the extra procedural step in making him a party. Diffi-
culty for the plaintiff will be encountered, however, if the non-party does
not live in the state where the action is brought.
In personal actions the basic requirement for obtaining jurisdiction
over a party is service of process upon him within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the court3 5 -usually, that is within the state in which the court is
located."9 This means that it is often impossible for the courts in one
state to get jurisdiction over parties who live in another. A ruling then,
that a non-party is indispensable may mean that the action cannot go
forward in the forum of the plaintiff's choice.
Presumably there is some forum in which jurisdiction can be ob-
tained over this indispensable non-party. But if there are more indis-
pensable parties than one, and if they live in different states, then there
may be no state in which jurisdiction over all of them can be obtained. °
And in most cases the reach of federal process is no longer than that of a
state,4 so that the plaintiff's predicament is not helped by the possibility
of resort to a federal court even if his acton is otherwise one over which
such a court would have jurisdiction. In some situations, therefore, a
ruling that a non-party is indispensable may in effect foreclose all courts
to a plaintiff.
In some cases the very number of persons who should be made
parties poses practical difficulties (such as ascertaining them all, keeping
abreast of constant changes in the group, and so on) which may prove
trast Sigal v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 119 Conn. 570, 177 At. 742 (1935). See
Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 MiCH. L. REv. 483, 501 (1957).
38. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), is the leading case on this point.
39. While Congress can constitutionally make the reach of federal process nationwide,
it has done so only in a few exceptional situations. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 22 (actions
under anti-trust laws); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2361 (interpleader actions).
For the most part, process issuing out of a federal court (other than a subpoena) may
be served only "within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held."
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (recent amendments have slightly extended this reach for persons
brought in on impleader or as necessary or indispensable parties).
40. This was probably the case in Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854);
Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1950); Bank of California
v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516, 106 P.2d 879 (1940). Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
41. See note 39 supra.
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insuperable in either a state or federal court. 2 Not only is the difficulty
of getting jurisdiction over nonresidents usually present when the action
is brought in a federal court, but additional difficulties are often encoun-
tered. If federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship43 this
means that diversity must be complete; no plaintiff may be a co-citizen
of the same state with any defendant." Even if process can be served
on an indispensable party, therefore ,his presence in the action may oust
a federal court of jurisdiction over the subject matter. And even when it
does not do that, the federal rule of venue may mean that the district in
which the action is originally brought is not a district in which the new
party may properly be sued over his objection to the venue; so that if
such objection is made, the action cannot go forward in that district.45
To make matters still worse there are still some situations in which venue
cannot properly be laid in any district if all indispensable parties are
brought into the action.46 Such a case cannot be brought before any
federal court unless the objection to venue is waived.
From the above it will be seen that a ruling that a non-party is
indispensable will not infrequently mean: (1) that the plaintiff's action
cannot go forward in the court of his choice; (2) that this is even more
often true where he has chosen a federal court; and in many of these
cases; (3) that all courts are foreclosed to plaintiff. Any of these results
imposes some hardship on the plaintiff, the last one a dire hardship. An
analysis of this aspect of the problem would be incomplete, however,
without pointing out some factors and some developments which tend
to reduce the frequency with which a ruling of indispensability involves
such serious results:
(a) It has long been the law that when an action is in rem the
court which has jurisdiction over the res has power to adjudicate all
interests in and claims to that res.47 Personal service over the holders
or claimants of such interests is not necessary so long as reasonable means
are chosen to notify them of the pendency of the action and give them a
chance to come in and present their claims.4" If, therefore, such an action
is brought in a state court having jurisdiction over the res, there is no
insuperable obstacle to bringing in any party whom a court holds indis-
pensable, unless the mere size of the group to be brought in imposes an
42. See, e.g., Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Corp., 188 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945).
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332.
44. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
45. The general federal venue provisions are found in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391. See Barrett,
Venue and Service of Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for Reform, 7 VAND.
L. REV. 608 (1954); 3 MooRE fr 19.04.
46. Barrett, supra note 45, at 621-22; 3 MooRE ff 19.04.
47. Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890); 1 FREEMAN § 347.
48. Ibid. Cf. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1958);
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
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obstacle. 49 In this context the distinction between necessary and indis-
pensable loses its significance. This category covers a wide and important
range of actions, for example most actions concerning real estate (except
those for damages for injury to it). What has been said of state courts is
also true of federal courts, so far as jurisdiction over the person is con-
cerned. In diversity cases, however, requirement of completely diverse
citizenship holds for in rem actions as well as other types, so that the
joinder of indispensable parties may still oust the court of jurisdiction
over the subject matter.50
(b) Even when an action is regarded as in personam, or not strictly
in rem, the requirements for obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant have
been substantially liberalized.51
(c) The concept of "involuntary plaintiff" softens the blow of a
ruling that a non-party is indispensable on the plaintiff's side, in an area
of limited but uncertain extent. Equity had developed the practice of
making an unwilling plaintiff a defendant to bring him into the action,
52
and this may be done under the codes and all modern procedures."5 This
device will not help, however, when jurisdiction cannot be obtained over
the unwilling party; the requirements on that score are the same as in the
case of any defendant.54 The involuntary plaintiff, on the other hand,
need not be served. He is named as plaintiff in spite of himself and is
bound by the judgment just as if he had voluntarily participated in bring-
ing the action.55 Obviously this cannot be done in all cases; due process
cannot be circumvented by so facile a form of words. There must have
been some relationship between the real plaintiff and the one whose name
is used, on the basis of. which either some kind of implied authority to
49. As in Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement & Dev. Corp., 188 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1945), discussed infra at notes 76-78. See Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in
Civil Actions, 55 Mica. L. REV. 483, 489-93 (1957).
50. Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U.S. 527 (1892); Parker v. Overman, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
137 (1855).
51. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction of State Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHi.
L. REV. 569 (1958) ; Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REV.
909 (1960).
52. CLARK at 354. Cf. Vinson v. Home Ins. Co., 123 W. Va. 522, 16 S.E.2d 924 (1941)
(case transferred from law to equity side to permit this practice).
53. A typical code provision is: "If one who ought to be joined as plaintiff shall de-
cline to join, he may be made a defendant, the reason therefor being stated in the com-
plaint." CLARE at 359-60.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) provides in part: "When a person who should join as a plaintiff
refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant, or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff."
54. Independent Wireless Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 269 U.S. 459 (1926);
McAulay v. Moody, 185 Fed. 144 (C.C. Ore. 1911).
55. Hawkinson v. Carnell & Bradburn, 26 F. Supp. 150 (E.D. Pa. 1938). See Paul E.
Hawkinson Co. v. Carnell, 112 F.2d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 1940). Contrast Gibbs v. Emerson Elec.
Mfg. Co., 29 F. Supp. 810 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
See generally Commentary, The Involuntary Plaintiff, 4 FED. RuLss SERv. 907 (1941);
3 MooRE 19.06.
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use it can be spelled out, or judicial imposition of such authority may be
warranted.56
The notion of involuntary plaintiff was not altogether unknown to
the common law though the term was not used. The assignee of a chose
in action could often sue in the assignor's name and the latter had no
say in the matter and no control over the action .7 The authority in this
kind of situation may be found in the assignment itself as well as in the
power of attorney which often accompanied it. There was also some
common-law authority for the similar use by one joint obligee of ano-
ther's name in an action to enforce the joint right.5" Equity, too, made
use of such a procedure. In the leading case of Independent Wireless
Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America,"9 the Supreme Court allowed suit
to be brought in the name of a patentee by its exclusive licensee of the
patent, to enjoin infringement thereof. This case was cited by the com-
mittee which drafted the federal rules, as an "example of a proper case
for involuntary plaintiff" in its note to Rule 19 which provides: "When
a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made
a defendant, or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff."00
It has been urged, with good reason,0 ' that a joint obligee of a
contract or other obligation may properly be made an involuntary plain-
tiff, but the recent cases to date have not gone so far.
(d) The doctrine of representation 2 and the representative or class
suit,63 where applicable, have enabled parties to overcome the difficulties
of indispensability.
56. Sources cited note 55 supra. In Rosen v. Rex Amusement Co., 14 F.R.D. 75 (D.D.C.
1952), authority to make a partner an involuntary plaintiff was denied where the appearing
plaintiffs sought to enforce some rights against the absent partner.
57. Farmers & Mechanics' Bank v. Humphrey, 36 Vt. 554 (1864); Cook, The Alien-
ability of Choses in Action, 29 HARv. L. REV. 816 (1916).
58. Union Naval Stores Co. v. Pugh, 156 Ala. 369, 47 So. 48 (1908) ; Harris v. Swanson
& Bros., 62 Ala. 299 (1878); Ingham Lumber Co. v. Ingersoll, 93 Ark. 447, 125 S.W. 139
(1910); Wright v. McLemore, 18 Tenn. (10 Yerg) 235 (1837); Comment, Compulsory
Joinder of Unwilling Plaintiffs in Civil Actions, 25 Mo. L. REv. 63 (1960); Note, 48 W. VA.
L.Q. 184 (1942). Cf. Chambers v. Donaldson, 9 East 471, 103 Eng. Rep. 653 (K.B. 1808).
A nonassenting partner could insist on indemnity against payment of costs.
59. 269 U.S. 459 (1926).
60. 3 MOORE ff 19.01[2] sets out the text of the original note.
61. After citing McAulay v. Moody, 185 Fed. 144 (C.C. Ore. 1911), in which the
action failed for want of jurisdiction and proper venue when a nonresident joint obligee
was sought to be made a defendant, Professor Moore continues: "The obligees were left
without a remedy. Both of these difficulties could be obviated by making the obligee an
involuntary plaintiff, and we believe that this is a 'proper case' for the application of that
doctrine." 3 MOORE 2150, 91 19.06, n.10. Compare also sources cited note 58 supra.
62. See text at note 7 supra.
63. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23; 3 MOORE at 3401-560. The subject of the class suit is an
interesting and controversial one. See, e.g., Keefe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur,
33 CORNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Kalven & Rosenfeld, Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. Ciai. L. REV. 684 (1941); Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigation in
the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 874 (1958).
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(e) There has been some use of the power of Congress to make
federal process nationwide. In the present connection the federal Inter-
pleader Act has within limits greatly increased the availability of parties
who may be held indispensable.64
Summary and analysis.-The considerations described in the fore-
going sections are, it is submitted, the principal ones, if not the only ones,
entitled to weight in determining whether a party is necessary or indis-
pensable. While they are basically few and simple, yet each one may
exist in varying decrees and the different interests represented often com-
pete so that the total net impact of all the relevant considerations varies
infinitely from case to case. Moreover, in many cases a factual inquiry
is needed before a realistic appraisal can be made of the weight properly
to be attached to one or more of the factors. Because of all this, the
problem does not readily lend itself to solution by fixed and rigid rules.
What is called for, rather, is flexibility and a case-by-case appraisal of
the relevant factors. Moreover, when the consequences of indispensability
are grave for the plaintiff, courts should be astute to fashion their decrees
so as to do as much justice as they can without unduly impairing the
interests of absentees or present parties. Completeness of judicial action
and avoidance of multiple suits are good things, but they should not
be bought at too high a price in terms of substantive justice.
The point of view set forth in the last paragraph has been urged
as the overall solution of this problem6" and it is probably consistent with
the historical development of the requirements for parties in equity.
Moreover it has found application in recent legislation"6 and in some well
reasoned recent cases. There are, however, classifications and formulas
which have currency with the courts today and they deserve separate
treatment. Before that is done a few examples of careful judicial appraisal
of the relevant considerations may well be described.
In Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp.,67 a preferred stockholder
sued a Delaware corporation in a Pennsylvania federal court to compel
the payment of dividends. Since dividends were payable "when and as
declared by the Board of Directors," the district court held a majority
of the board members to be indispensable parties.68 According to the
plaintiff's claim there was no one state or federal district in which a
majority might be served. The court of appeals reversed this ruling. It
64. See note 39 supra. For treatments of the problems involved in interpleader, see,
e.g., Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 YALE L.J. 963, 1161 (1936);
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV.
874 (1958).
65. See sources cited note 4 supra.
66. Ibid.
67. 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950), 50 CoLum. L. REV. 997
(1950), 49 MIcH. L. REv. 275 (1950).
68. Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 9 F.R.D. 273 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
69. 179 F.2d at 762.
19631
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VoL. XVIII
found that under the allegations of the complaint, affairs had "reached
the point where the judgment of the directors is no longer controlling,""
under substantive law. The court's judgment based on a rule of law
had become substituted for the directors' business judgment. If formal
action had to be recorded on a minute book "that formal action [was]
nothing but a ministerial act."'" Further, the decree could be made effec-
tive without the directors' being bound by it. A chancellor "with legal
imagination" could "do a great deal" to corporate property within Penn-
sylvania, by sequestration, if need be. If the formal act of the directors
was necessary to fulfill Delaware law,
we cannot think that a receivership or sequestration of a foreign
corporation's property will not produce the result. Equity courts
have known for a long time how to impose onerous alternatives
at home to the performance of affirmative acts abroad as a
means of getting those affirmative acts accomplished.72
In Bank of California v. Superior Court,8 plaintiff sued to enforce
the provisions of an alleged contract with the decedent to leave her
entire estate (about 225,000 dollars) to the plaintiff. The decedent's
will "left individual legacies and bequests amounting to $60,000 to
a large number of legatees, including charitable institutions and indivi-
duals, some residing in other states and in foreign countries." 4 The
executor and all beneficiaries under the will were named defendants but
only the executor and the residuary legatee were served. The California
Supreme Court held that the trial court had discretion to allow the action
to proceed without the missing beneficiaries. Their share of the estate
would not be affected at all-the plaintiff would simply get less than she
claimed because of their absence.75 And the objections addressed to
inconvenience and possible multiplicity of suits were properly to be
weighed in the exercise of discretion but would not bar the action as a
matter of law.
In Hicks v. Southwestern Settlement Dev. Corp.,76 104 tenants in
common, as heirs of Tom Collier, sued for possession of oil and gas lands
and for damages for the withdrawal and appropriation of oil and gas.
70. Id. at 763.
71. Id. at 764. Cf. W.Q. O'Neall Co. v. O'Neall, 118 Ind. App. 116, 25 N.E.2d 656
(1940); Rockenfield v. Kuhl, 242 Iowa 213, 46 N.W.2d 17 (1951).
72. 179 F.2d, at 764, 765. The decision in the Kroese case has been followed in Doherty
v. Mutual Warehouse Co., 245 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1957); Whittemore v. Continental Mills,
98 F. Supp. 387 (D. Me. 1951); Swinton v. W.J. Bush & Co., 199 Misc. 321, 102 N.Y.S.2d
994 (Sup. Ct. 1951) aff'd, 278 App. Div. 754, 103 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1951). But contrast
Schuckman v. Rubenstein, 164 F.2d 952 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) ;
Note, 50 MICH. L. REv. 275 (1950) (approving result in Kroese but stating that majority
view was then opposed to it).
73. 16 Cal. 2d 516, 106 P.2d 879 (1940).
74. Id. at 518, 106 P.2d at 882.
75. Cf. Stumpf v. Fidelity Gas Co., 294 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1961).
76. 188 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
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The defendants pleaded that there were 574 other heirs who were indis-
pensable parties. The trial court dismissed the action because of their
non-joinder, but the appellate court reversed this ruling. It recognized
that tenants in common should all join in seeking damages, 77 but never-
theless allowed the plaintiffs to proceed because of the hardship which
would otherwise be involved. It described the situation graphically as
follows:
The petition names 104 plaintiffs, of whom perhaps 17 are
formal parties. Plaintiffs include residents of fifteen counties in
Texas and two parishes in Louisiana; two come from Michigan,
and one from Puerto Rico. The pleas in abatement now list
574 additional heirs of Tom Collier and tenants in common of
appellants who are described as necessary parties to this suit.
It is with more than casual interest that we have searched for
some evidence or some statement to the effect that these were
all of such heirs, but we have not found such evidence or such a
statement in the record. It seems of direct significance to the
application of the exceptions noted that appellees amended their
pleas in abatement twice; that their first amended pleas in
abatement listed 512 such heirs and that 63 additional heirs
were named in the second amended pleas, on which the trial
court acted. It now appears that five persons who were named
in said first amended pleas are dead; that three persons named
in said pleas are now described as married women, and that
mistakes in the names of several individuals have been dis-
covered and corrected. The first amended pleas are not in the
transcript; they have been adopted and described generally in
defendants' second amended pleas, but we have observed that
among the 63 additional heirs are residents of four additional
states, namely, of two counties in New Mexico, one county in
Arizona, two counties in Georgia, and one county in Florida.
These 63 persons also include residents of three additional
parishes in Louisiana and nine additional counties in Texas.
Among these 63, one unknown person, a formal party, is re-
ferred to; no addresses are given for two persons; and eight
minors are listed, without reference to guardianship. Although
we have no information respecting the status and residence of
the 512 heirs listed in the first amended plea, we feel safe in
assuming that they are as diversely scattered about the United
States and are of as varied a status as are the 63 additional per-
sons named in the second amended pleas. 8
THE TEST FORMULATED IN Shields v. Barrow
The most famous formulation made by an American court of the
general equitable rule governing indispensable and necessary parties is
77. Id. at 919, citing May v. Slade, 24 Tex. 205 (1859). The purpose of the rule re-
quiring joinder here is to avoid multiplicity of suits.
78. Id. at 927, 928.
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that found in Shields v. Barrow,7 decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States in 1854. Under this test parties are indispensable
who not only have an interest in the controversy, but an interest
of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made without
either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such
a condition that its final termination may be wholly inconsistent
with equity and good conscience.80
Necessary parties are those
having an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made
parties, in order that the court may act on that rule which re-
quires it to decide on, and finally determine the entire contro-
versy, and do complete justice, by adjusting all the rights in-
volved in it.81
These passages so far as quoted embody a test quite consistent with the
one suggested here. The protection of the non-party's interest is clearly
referred to; and a judgment which unduly prejudices a present party
because of a non-party's absence may well be described as a "termination
[of the case] inconsistent with equity and good conscience." Moreover,
there is nothing in the statements quoted above which suggests a rigid
rule rather than the balancing of interests from case to case in the man-
ner so traditional with equity.
In spite of all this, as Professor Reed has shown in a perceptive
article,8 2 Shields v. Barrow has had a restrictive effect on the law and
represents a stage in the development of the equitable doctrine wherein
the earlier imaginative flexibility had given way to a search for rules
that afforded more of certainty, and consequently of rigidity. This is
reflected not in the passages quoted above but in the references imme-
diately thereafter and at other points in the opinion to the concept of
"separability," and in the actual holding of the court. Unavailable neces-
sary parties need not be joined "if their interests are separable from
those of the parties before the court." 8 And where rescisson of a con-
tract is sought, the interests of all the parties to it were held inseparable.
If separability is used simply as a compendious word to sum up
the result of weighing the considerations listed above,8" perhaps no great
79. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854).
80. Id. at 139.
81. Ibid.
82. Reed, supra note 3, at 343-56.
83. 58 U.S. (17 How.) at 139.
84. This may be what the court had in mind in the passage quoted at note 71 supra,
for the context of the quotation is this-if the interests of the directors are separable from
those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree, and do
complete and final jujstice, without affecting other persons not before the court, the latter
are not indispensable parties.
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harm is done, though the word is not a particularly apt one to describe
such a process, and it is confusing for its suggestion of other considera-
tions extraneous to the list. The word seems to suggest, and is often
intended to convey, a reference to some additional formal test such as
whether the words of an instrument create a joint obligation' 5 (as op-
posed to a several obligation), or whether (as in Shields v. Barrow itself)
all of the parties in question were parties to a single instrument which was
challenged. 6 The notion here seemed to be that the instrument would
either have to stand or fall as a whole and could not, for example, be can-
celled as to some (those who are parties) and left intact as to others (non-
parties). But as Professor Reed has shown,87 this is much too concep-
tualistic; it is characteristic of the type of thinking that sees everything
as either all white or all black. A multi-party agreement is a complex
of rights and obligations and it is in fact perfectly possible to strike some
down and to leave others alone. Perhaps a court should not do this in
any given case, but if it should not, that is because of one or more of
the considerations listed above. There is, it is submitted, no valid basis
for an additional requirement of separability before a non-party's pre-
sence may be dispensed with; yet, statements of the rule frequently con-
tain this as a distinct and separable requirement and this of course has
not been without influence. I
PARTIES HAVING JOINT OR UNITED INTERESTS
The typical code provisions require joinder as plaintiffs or defend-
ant of "parties who are united in interest." 8 The federal rules provide
that "persons having a joint interest shall be made parties."89
So far as technically joint rights and obligations go, these provisions
carry forward the traditional common-law rules. Joint obligees were
indispensable parties plaintiff." Joint obligors had to be joined as defend-
ants but an unavailable obligor could be dispensed with.91 Statutes in
85. See text and authorities cited at notes 88-96 infra.
86. See also text and authorities cited at notes 110-15 infra.
87. Reed, supra note 3, at 343-46.
88. CLARK at 358.
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
90. Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U.S. 579 (1890); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 3 F.
RuLEs SEnv. 2d 19b. 321, Case 1 (D. Ore. 1960); McAulay v. Moody, 185 Fed. 144
(D. Ore. 1911); Dewey v. Carey, 60 Mo. 224 (1875); CLARK § 57; 3 MOORE 1 19.11; RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 129 (1932). Cf. McGinnis v. General Exch. Ins. Corp., 142 Kan.
338, 46 P.2d 876 (1935).
91. Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308 (1919); Greenleaf v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 140 F.2d
889 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 736; RESTATEa ENT, CONTRACTS § 117 (1932).
All joint obligors must be joined on appropriate objection "except such of them as are
at the time of suit dead or beyond the jurisdiction of the court." See Baldwin v. Ely, 127
Pa. Super. 110, 114, 193 At. 299, 301 (1937). See also Dillon v. Barnard, 328 Mass. 53, 101
N.E.2d 345 (1951); Reed, supra note 3, at 357-67; CLARK § 60; 3 MOORE 5 19.11.
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many states made joint obligations joint and several,92 but joint rights
remain joint.98
The indispensability of the joint obligees as plaintiffs was tem-
pered, by some courts at least, by the notion that each had given implied
authority to the others to use his name if need be.94 And there was some
authority allowing an unavailable obligee to be omitted. 5
The law today is in about the same state. There is perhaps good
reason for joinder of all joint obligors or obligees where that is feasible.
In either case completeness of judgment and avoidance of unnecessary
litigation will be furthered, in the social interest. In the case of joint
obligees, their joinder will also protect the defendant from undue harass-
ment. He has incurred only a single obligation and should be sued only
once for it. But while these reasons are entitled to weight, they scarcely
warrant the denial of substantive justice to the present obligees, or to
obligees who can find only some of their joint obligors. And none of the
other considerations listed above apply; absentees will not be prejudically
affected, nor will present parties by a judgment which does not bind
absentees (except only as this leaves the door open to further suits).
There is then no justification for a rule which will stop the action for
want to unavailable joint obligors or joint obligees. And if the latter
are viewed as indispensable for historical or technical reasons, then the
unavailable obligees should properly be made involuntary plaintiffs.
The same considerations which call for conditionally compulsory
joinder of joint obligees apply to other situations also. As we have seen,
partial assignees of a chose in action may sue in their own name, but
the holders of all fractions of the single claim are necessary parties, as
they should be, though not indispensable parties.96
There is considerable authority for the proposition that tenants
in common of real estate must all join in an action for damages to the
property97 (although one co-tenant alone may sue for possession of it95).
Here again, threat of multiple actions and harassment warrants a require-
92. See Burdick, Joint and Several Liability of Partners, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 101
(1911); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 336 (rev. ed. 1936) (collecting statutes). Cf. UNI'aOrM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-118(e).
93. Sources cited supra note 90; Reed, supra note 3, at 367-69.
94. Note 58 supra.
95. Keene v. Chambers, 271 N.Y. 326, 3 N.E.2d 443 (1936). Cf. 39 Am. JuR. Parties
§ 30, p. 893 (1942).
96. See note 15 supra.
97. Guth v. Texas Co., 155 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1946); Bullock v. Hayward, 92 Mass.
(10 Allen) 460 (1865) ; DePuy v. Strong, 37 N.Y. 372 (1867) (in last two cases, defect
was held waived by failure of timely objection). See Cummings v. Greif Bros. Cooperage
Co., 202 F.2d 824, 829 (8th Cir. 1953) (joint owners).
98. Most v. Passman, 21 Cal. App. 2d 729, 70 P.2d 271 (1937); Locklear v. Oxendine,
233 N.C. 710, 65 S.E.2d 673 (1951).
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ment of joinder where that is feasible, but not at the possible cost of
denying meritorious relief where it is not.9
PARTIES HAVING INTERESTS IN REAL ESTATE
At the ouset it should be recalled that actions to determine interests
in real estate are in rem, so that no party is unavailable simply because
he is beyond reach of the court's process.' °0 Difficulty here may, however,
come from the fact that parties are embarrassingly numerous (as with
the heirs of Tom Collier'), that the holders of contingent interests are
sometimes unascertainable and perhaps not even in being; and that
federal jurisdiction based on diversity may be ousted by their joinder." 2
This wider availability of parties in this type of case means that a
ruling of indispensability is fraught with less serious consequences for
the plaintiff; in practically all cases he can get redress in the courts of
the state in which the land lies. Such a ruling may, however, deprive the
plaintiff of his access to a federal court. Whether, on balance, this is a
good or a bad thing will depend on one's attitude towards diversity
jurisdiction generally, and particularly where the question is one of local
land law. In any event, it submitted, the availability of the state court
is a factor properly to be considered by the federal court in weighing
the relative interests which will be affected by a ruling of indispensa-
bility.' Even if the plaintiff's preference for the federal forum deserves
the court's enthusiastic protection, the disappointment of that choice
is not as great a hardship on the plaintiff as the foreclosing of all courts
to him.
All who hold or claim interests in the land which may be affected
by the relief sought are indispensable parties.'0 4 Thus, the record title
owners of all the parcels of land which the plaintiff claims to have
acquired by right of accretion, must be made parties in his action to have
his claim declared valid.0 5 All tenants in common to land must be joined
in an action for its partition.'06 In an action to foreclose a mortgage or
99. Some cases allow one tenant in common to maintain an action for damages with-
out joining his co-tenants. Young v. Garrett, 149 F.2d 223 (8th Cir. 1945) (under Arkansas
law each tenant recovers his aliquot share) ; Carlson v. McNeill, 114 Colo. 78, 162 P.2d
226 (1945) ; Lee v. Follensby, 86 Vt. 401, 85 At. 915 (1913) (one co-tenant recovers for
whole damage but holds shares of other co-tenants in trust for them).
100. Note 47 supra.
101. Note 76 supra.
102. Fouke v. Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1952); text at note 50 supra, and
at notes 43 and 44 supra.
103. See Fouke v. Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1952) (noting availability
of state court).
104. McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1960) ; Stewart v. United States,
242 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1957) ; Fouke v. Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1952).
105. McShan v. Sherrill, 283 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1960).
106. Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1867); Henry Quellmalz Lumber
& Mfg. Co. v. Roche, 145 Ark. 38, 223 S.W. 376 (1920); Gates v. Salmon, 35 Cal. 576
(1868).
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other lien, the owner of the equity of redemption and all junior encum-
brancers are generally regarded as indispensable parties.' On the other
hand, holders of interests which will not be disturbed or affected by the
relief need not be joined. Thus, in the partition case, a lessee of the
property need not, by the weight of authority, be made a party since the
relief affects only the reversion and leaves the tenancy intact.'0 8 And
in foreclosure cases, where liens senior to the plaintiff's will not be dis-
turbed by the judgment sought, the senior lienors need not be joined. 09
PARTIES TO AN INSTRUMENT
A question often arises whether all parties to an instrument need be
joined in an action to cancel or reform it. The instrument may affect
interests in land (e.g., lease, deed, mortgage), or it may not (e.g.,
insurance policy). It is often said that all such parties are indispensa-
ble" and indeed under the facts of any given case it will often appear
that the omitted party is indispensable under the tests suggested above.
Thus, where a stockholder and creditors of a corporation sued it to set
aside transfers of corporate property which the corporation had allegedly
made ultra vires and without consideration, the grantees were held indis-
pensable. Any decree in their absence-since it could not bind the
grantees-would be ineffective and futile, except as it cast a cloud on the
grantees' title and therefore created some bargaining leverage against
them. And to the extent it did that, the decree would adversely affect
their interests without a chance on their part to be heard on the merits."'
But parties to an instrument may have passed out of the picture so
far as any significant present interest goes, and the only need for their
presence may be a vestige of the notion that equity once acted only in
personam so that the effectiveness of her decrees depended on coercing
107. See, e.g., Black v. London Assur. Co. of London, 122 F. Supp. 330 (W.D.S.C.
1954) (judgment lienors junior to mortgage); Auburn Ins. Agency v. First Nat'l Bank,
263 Ala. 30, 81 So.2d 600 (1955) (second mortgage); City of Wilmington v. Merrick, 231
N.C. 297, 56 S.E.2d 643 (1949) ; 4 AM. LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 16.188, 16.191 (1952).
C. Kling v. Ghilarducci, 3 I1. 2d 454, 121 N.E.2d 752 (1954).
The use of the term necessary or indispensable here-at least for junior incumbrancers
-probably does not mean that the action cannot proceed in their absence, but rather that
their absence will render defective any title based on the judgment. See Reed, supra note
3, at 510-17; 4 AM. LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 16.188, 16.191 (1952).
108. See, e.g., Fyffe v. Fyffe, 292 Ill. App. 539, 11 N.E.2d 857 (1937); Bethel College
v. Gladdish, 204 Ky. 10, 263 S.W. 659 (1924); Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 571 (1870);
Peterman v. Kingsley, 140 Wis. 666, 123 N.W. 137 (1909). Compare Willard v. Willard,
145 U.S. 116 (1892); Finch v. Smith, 146 Ala. 644, 41 So. 819 (1906) (outstanding lease
no bar to partition).
109. See, e.g., Mason v. Cathedral Bldg. Corp., 125 F. Supp. 542 (D. Alaska 1954);
4 Am. LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 16.190 (1952).
110. See, e.g., Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 129 (1854); Brodsky v. Perth
Amboy Nat'l Bank, 259 F.2d 705 (3d Cir. 1958); Kentucky Natural Gas Corp. v. Duggins,
165 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1948); Morco Properties v. Cumberland Constr. Co., 19 F.R.D.
224 (W.D. Ky. 1956); Cunningham v. Brewer, 144 Neb. 211, 16 N.W.2d 533 (1944).
111. Baten v. Nona-Fletcher Mineral Co., 198 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1952).
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSABLE PARTIES
the personal obedience of the original party to the instrument to be
reformed or rescinded." 2 When this is the case, it is submitted that the
party's presence may be dispensed with now that equitable decrees are
given in rem effect in such cases." 3 Thus, in an action in ejectment be-
tween two grantees of a common grantor, where one of them claimed that
the deeds should be reformed, it has been held that the grantor is not
an indispensable party though he should be joined if available.
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In other cases, the absence of some parties to the instrument may mean
only that a decree will lack perfect completeness. This should not stand
in the way of a useful (if incomplete) decree when the incompleteness
carries no threat of substantial injustice to anyone besides the plaintiff,
and when the alternative to incomplete relief is no relief at all." 5
112. J.R. v. M.P., Y.B. 37 Hen. VI (C.P. 1459) reprinted in FIELD & KAPLAN,
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 268 (1953). See sources cited note 34
supra.
113. See notes 35 and 36 supra.
114. Flowers v. Germann, 211 Minn. 412, 1 N.W.2d 424 (1941). Cf. Crary v. Good-
man, 12 N.Y. 266 (1855), discussed in CLARK at 625 n.158.
115. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, 8 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
Reed, supra note 3, at 343-56 (containing an admirable analysis of Shields v. Barrow).
In the Brandenburg case Judge Knox said: "courts are wary of the danger of per-
mitting contradictory judicial orders being directed to a single fund, but are not so dis-
turbed where the only possible inconsistency is that of two persons whose claims appear to
be similar, one may ultimately recover and the other may not." 8 F.R.D. at 154.
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